High Court
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High Court dismisses deprivation of liberty bid for 12-year-old ‘escapee’

A judge at the family division of the High Court has dismissed an application by a local authority for a deprivation of liberty order for a 12-year-old boy, D, described by his social worker as “an escapee”.

Following a hearing on 20th July 2026, a judgment for London Borough of Enfield -v- The Mother, Father and D [2026] EWHC 2846 (Fam) was handed down remotely on 4th November, dismissing the application by the local authority on the grounds that “D is not being deprived of his liberty”.

D was taken into foster care when he was five months old. He has had the same foster carer since his removal from parental care shortly after his birth, and has “a warm and loving relationship” with her.

He has diagnoses of ASD, foetal alcohol syndrome with frontal lobe impairment, mild cerebellar dysplasia and global developmental delay. He has “very limited” verbal communication, is doubly incontinent and requires full support across all areas of his day-to-day living, and attends a specialist school. 

D is restricted within his home, within his respite placement and at school. He requires constant supervision within the home and the community. The court heard that D will attempt to leave his home if doors and windows are not kept locked. 

The London borough of Enfield made the application for a 12-month deprivation of liberty order under section 100 of the Children Act 1989 in June 2026.

A local authority might apply for a deprivation of liberty order when a vulnerable child or young person requires strict confinement, constant supervision, and control, and no other statutory framework (such as a Secure Accommodation Order under Section 25 of the Children Act 1989 or the Mental Health Act 1983) is available or suitable. A 12-month order is typically used to provide a long-term legal safety net while care or educational arrangements are established. 

On 8th July 2026, the application came before Recorder Rhys Taylor sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge in the Deprivation of Liberty List. It was referred by Taylor to Ms Justice Henke at the High Court family division because it was one of the first such cases to follow the landmark 2nd June judgment, A Reference by the Attorney General for Northern Ireland [2026], in which the UK Supreme Court unanimously overruled the 2014 decision in P v Cheshire West and Chester Council. 

The local authority’s position at the hearing in July was that neither the objective nor the subjective element of Storck (Storck (a) and (b)) was met. 

Derived from the landmark European Court of Human Rights case Storck v Germany (2005), “Storck (a)” and “Storck (b)” are the first two legal requirements used to determine whether a person is being legally deprived of their liberty. These components establish whether an individual’s situation legally amounts to a restriction of freedom or a true detention.

On behalf of D, it was argued that D’s situation amounts to confinement and that D cannot consent to that confinement.

The December 2025 health assessment recorded that D could communicate with single words and would use picture boards and simple signs to aid communication. D needs help to interpret what he is saying, however, and D’s foster carer is best placed to do that. 

D generally goes to bed at 9-9:30pm and wakes every four hours. His foster mother or her partner attends to D in the night, and there is a bed in his room for them to sleep in.

The child’s social worker described D as “an escapee” and the court hearing considered whether his attempts to leave his setting amounted to “opposition to his living arrangements” or, rather, curiosity and a lack of sense of danger. 

In her judgment Henke said: “I find, on the balance of probabilities, that D is content with his circumstances and the restrictive measures in place. I have considered his attempts to leave when doors or windows are unlocked as well as the absence of a verbal objection…I do not interpret the attempts to leave as an expression of opposition to his living arrangements.”

She concluded: “IOn the facts before me, for the reasons given, I have decided that D is not being deprived of his liberty. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.”

The local authority was represented by Nerys Wyn Rees. D, through his foster mother, was represented by Zahra Manji.

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