Jane Keir, Holly Shaw and Georgina Prest from Kingsley Napley LLP examine the decision in Mahmoud v Glanville and explain the implications for future costs orders.
Costs orders in children proceedings remain unusual. The general rule is that each party bears their own costs, reflecting the court’s focus on the child’s welfare and the importance of avoiding financial penalties that may inflame parental conflict.
However, the decision in Mahmoud v Glanville [2025] EWHC 2395 (Fam) stands out as an exception and illustrates the court’s limits of judicial tolerance for litigation misconduct. The case involved serious breaches of court orders, abductions and a pattern of manipulative litigation conduct by the mother, which culminated in a substantial costs order and a pro bono costs order against her.
The judgment is a clear reminder that while costs orders in children proceedings are exceptional, they remain an important mechanism for protecting the integrity of the court proceedings.
This article examines the legal principles surrounding costs in children cases and the implications of the judgment.
Background: A Pattern of breaches, abduction and litigation misconduct
The litigation concerned a Child Arrangements Order made in April 2020, which provided that the child would live with his mother and spend time with his father. The order prohibited either parent from removing the child from the jurisdiction of England and Wales without the other parent’s written consent or a further court order.
Despite this, the mother breached the order on multiple occasions. She travelled abroad without permission, disregarded location orders, and pleaded a series of allegations against the father that were ultimately found to be unfounded. The situation escalated dramatically in 2024 when the mother abducted the child from outside his school and successfully concealed his whereabouts for eight months, evading the father, police and the court, before the child was eventually located and returned to the father’s care.
Throughout the proceedings, the court found the mother to be dishonest, unreliable and prone to making unsubstantiated accusations, including claims of bribery, forgery and collusion against legal professionals and caseworkers. She demonstrated no insight into the court’s concerns or the impact of her behaviour on the child.
This distinction between ordinary adversarial litigation and conduct that undermines the administration of justice proved to be central to the court’s award of a costs order in favour of the father.
Legal principles governing costs in children proceedings
The starting point in children’s proceedings is that each party pays their own costs. This reflects the principle that litigation about children should not be treated as adversarial and promotes the overriding concern of the court – the welfare of the child – which often leads courts to avoid making an order in relation to costs.
Costs orders are therefore exceptional and must be justified by litigation conduct that is unreasonable, reprehensible or otherwise outside of the norm.
Importantly, the presence of unreasonable behaviour does not automatically lead to a costs order. The court retains a broad discretion and must consider whether an award would be fair, just and proportionate in all the circumstances.
Why the threshold was met in Mahmoud v Glanville
The judge concluded that the mother’s conduct throughout the litigation clearly justified an exceptional costs order.
Her behaviour involved repeated and deliberate breaches of court orders, the abduction of the child, sustained attempts to frustrate the legal process and persistent allegations lacking evidential foundation.
Taken together, these actions imposed significant burdens on the father, the court system and third-party authorities, including the police.
The court therefore made a standard basis costs order of £95,000 in favour of the father and a pro bono costs order of £20,000 payable to the Access to Justice Foundation.
The decision emphasised that the purpose of a costs order in children proceedings is not to punish wrongdoing in a general sense, but to respond to litigation conduct that undermines the administration of justice.
Comparison with appellate authority
In E (Children: Costs) [2025] EWCA Civ 183, the Court of Appeal considered whether a costs order should be made following the mother’s serious but unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse against the children by their father. The first instance judge declined to make any order as to costs, treating the proceedings as broadly symmetrical given the cross-allegations made by both parties.
The Court of Appeal allowed the father’s appeal, holding that the mother’s extreme allegations were of an entirely different character to the other cross-allegations, having completely transformed the proceedings and caused extraordinary delay and hugely increased costs. The court ordered the mother to pay 50% of the father’s costs up to the date of the fact-finding judgment.
This case confirms that unreasonable litigation conduct may justify a costs order but stressed that the decision must be rooted in the impact of that conduct on the fairness and efficiency of the proceedings. Costs decisions in children cases are fact-specific and require a careful evaluation of the litigation process as a whole.
The limits of the costs jurisdiction
A useful contrast is provided by Pringle v Nervo [2026] EWCA Civ 266, where the Court of Appeal overturned a substantial costs order of £385,587 (75% of the mother’s costs) made against a father at first instance.
Although aspects of the father’s conduct were criticised, the court concluded that his behaviour did not meet the high threshold required to justify a costs order. This decision highlights that costs orders are not designed to punish misconduct in a general sense. They are reserved for conduct that is truly unreasonable in the context of the proceedings as to justify departing from the usual rule that each party bears their own costs and the importance of evaluating the conduct of both parties and of ensuring that the threshold for a costs order is applied consistently.
What does this mean for future costs applications?
Mahmoud v Glanville provides a powerful example of the circumstances in which the court will intervene to protect the integrity of the litigation process. The decision sends a clear message that deliberate obstruction, persistent non-compliance and abuse of the court system may carry significant financial consequences.
That said, this case should not be read as signalling a broader shift in judicial approach. The decision in Mahmoud was highly fact-specific, and the threshold for such orders remains high, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in both E and Pringle. Together, these decisions confirm that the court will continue to exercise caution in balancing fairness, proportionality and the welfare of the child.
The lesson is straightforward: costs orders in children proceedings remain exceptional, but where litigation conduct becomes truly egregious, they remain a real and powerful remedy.
About the authors
Jane Keir is a partner in the Family Law team at Kingsley Napley and one of the country’s leading divorce lawyers. She has extensive experience of family disputes including high-profile financial cases, securing favourable settlements through discussion and negotiation, and cases involving children issues.
Holly Shaw is a senior associate in the Costs team at Kingsley Napley. She advises individuals, businesses, insurers and public bodies on costs strategy, budgeting, funding, and recovery across high-profile and high-value disputes, with a practice spanning family proceedings, commercial litigation, defamation and privacy matters, and other specialist areas.
Georgina Prest is a paralegal in the Costs team at Kingsley Napley. She supports the team in advising the firm’s internal practice areas on a broad range of costs matters. Georgina graduated from the University of Edinburgh with a degree in Philosophy and Economics before completing the Graduate Diploma in Law.
